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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott was an 
important milestone in takings jurisprudence.1  But for many 
observers, it was even more significant because of its potential 
implications for the doctrine of stare decisis.2  Knick overruled a key 
part of a 34-year-old decision, Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank.3  Some fear that the Knick decision 
signals the start of a campaign by the Court’s conservative majority that 
will lead to the ill-advised overruling of other precedents.  In his dissent 
in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, a recent case overruling a different 
40-year-old precedent, Justice Stephen Breyer complained that 
“[t]oday’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the Court 
will overrule next.”4  Less than six weeks later, Justice Elena Kagan 
referenced Breyer’s statement in her dissenting opinion in Knick: 
“[w]ell, that didn’t take long.  Now one may wonder yet again.”5 
Such fears are, to some extent, understandable, given ideological 
and jurisprudential differences between the justices and the deep 
ideological polarization in American society generally.  However, at 
least when it comes to Knick, they are misplaced.  This Article explains 
why the Knick Court was justified in overruling Williamson County, 
based on both the Supreme Court’s own established rules for 
overruling precedent and on leading theories of stare decisis advanced 
 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019). 
 2. See Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a “Catch 22” that Barred 
Takings Cases from Federal Court, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 171 (2019) 
[hereinafter Somin, Knick]; cf. Tadhg A.J. Dooley & David Roth, Supreme Court 
Update, NAT’L L. REV. (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-update-knick-v-township-scott-
no-17-647-nc-dep-t-revenue-v-kimberley [https://perma.cc/B9P8-4A5C] 
(“Knick stands on its own as an important constitutional takings decision, but may well 
be remembered most as another example of the Roberts Court chipping away at 
longstanding precedent”); Henry Gass, Overruled: Is Precedent in Danger at the 
Supreme Court?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0625/Overruled-Is-precedent-in-
danger-at-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/K3SM-S6QF]. 
 3. 473 U.S. 172 (1985); see Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 4. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 5. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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by individual justices and prominent legal scholars, both originalists 
and living constitutionalists. 
Knick reversed a key provision of Williamson County that created 
what Chief Justice John Roberts described as a “Catch-22”: preventing 
property owners from filing takings cases against state and local 
governments in federal court.6  Under Williamson County, a property 
owner who claimed that the government had taken her property and 
therefore owed her “just compensation” under the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, could not file a case in federal court without first 
securing a “final decision” from the relevant state regulatory agency 
and “exhausting” all possible remedies in state court.7  Takings claims 
were not considered “ripe” for adjudication until these two 
prerequisites were met.8  The validity of this second “exhaustion” 
requirement was the point at issue in Knick. 
Even after both Williamson County requirements were met, it was 
still essentially impossible to bring a federal claim because procedural 
rules precluded federal courts from reviewing final decisions in cases 
initially brought in state court.9  In San Remo Hotel v. City and County 
of San Francisco, the Court ruled that a final decision in a takings case 
from a state court precluded relitigation of the same issue in federal 
court.10  As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his majority opinion in 
Knick, “[t]he takings plaintiff thus finds himself in a Catch-22: He 
cannot go to federal court without going to state court first; but if he 
goes to state court and loses, his claim will be barred in federal court.  
The federal claim dies aborning.”11 
To make this system even more absurd, some state and local 
governments defending against takings claims even exercised their 
right to “remove” the case to federal court (on the grounds that it 
raised a federal question).12  They then successfully moved to get the 
case dismissed because the property owner did not manage to first 
“exhaust” state court remedies, as required by Williamson County — 
a failure caused by the defendants’ own choice to have the case 
removed.13  All of this, at the very least, made Williamson County a 
 
 6. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 7. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186, 194–95. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 10. 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005). 
 11. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 12. The federal question jurisdiction statute is found at 28 U.SC. § 1331 (1948). 
 13. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Marathon, 718 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(dismissing a takings claim removed to federal court under Williamson County); 
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strong candidate for overruling under any reasonable approach to stare 
decisis.  Even if some incorrect precedents should be allowed to stand, 
Williamson County was sufficiently egregious that perhaps it should 
not have been one of them. 
The rule of deference to precedent derives from the Latin maxim 
stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to stand by things 
decided and not disturb settled points.”14  Deciding whether to 
overrule a precedent requires addressing two issues: whether  the 
precedent in question is correct or incorrect, and determining the 
necessary justifications for overruling an erroneous precedent.15  If 
judges conclude that the challenged precedent was wrongly decided, 
they must decide whether to improve the law by correcting perceived 
mistakes or letting the mistakes remain in order to preserve reliance 
interests and respect for the rule of law.16 
If Williamson County was correctly decided, then it would obviously 
follow that the Knick Court was wrong to overrule it.  Stare decisis only 
comes into play in a situation where the precedent in question was 
wrong as an initial matter, but it can be argued that it should be 
maintained nonetheless.  As a prominent recent treatise on judicial 
precedent puts it, stare decisis enters the picture “when a court has 
determined that the prior decision was wrongly decided.”17  Justice 
Antonin Scalia similarly emphasized that “[t]he whole function of the 
doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under 
proper analysis, must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest 
of stability.”18  A recent Supreme Court decision frankly avows that 
“[r]especting stare decisis means sticking with some wrong 
decisions.”19 
 
Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1418 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). The Supreme 
Court ruled that such “removal” shenanigans were permissible, despite the fact that 
the removed claim would not be “ripe” under Williamson County. City of Chicago v. 
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 14. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 5 (2016) 
(quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 841 (3d ed. 
2011)). 
 15. See RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 12 
(2017). 
 16. See id. at 4. 
 17. GARNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 391. 
 18. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 139 (1997). 
 19. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015). 
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Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the reasons why Williamson 
County was wrongly decided,20 and why the Knick Court was justified 
in overruling it on the merits — at least aside from the doctrine of stare 
decisis.  This Article’s purpose is not to defend Knick’s rejection of 
Williamson County against those who believe the latter was correctly 
decided.21  Rather, for present purposes, we assume that Williamson 
County was indeed wrong, and consider whether the Knick Court 
should have nonetheless, refused to overrule it because of the doctrine 
of stare decisis.  However, as discussed more fully below, the reasons 
why Williamson County was wrong are relevant to assessing the Knick 
Court’s decision to reverse it rather than keeping it in place out of 
deference to precedent. 
Part II shows that Knick’s overruling of Williamson County was 
amply justified based on the Supreme Court’s existing criteria for 
overruling constitutional decisions, which may be called its “precedent 
on overruling precedent.”  While that doctrine is not a model of clarity, 
Knick’s application of it to Williamson County turns out to be 
relatively straightforward.  Part II also addresses Justice Elena Kagan’s 
claim in her Knick dissent, that the majority’s conclusion “requires 
declaring precedent after precedent after precedent wrong,” thereby 
reversing numerous cases that long predate Knick.22 
Part III explains why the overruling of Williamson County was 
justified based on the current leading originalist theories of precedent 
advanced by prominent legal scholars,23 and by Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas in his recent concurring opinion in Gamble v. United 
States.24  The key consideration here is that Williamson County itself 
had no basis in original meaning. 
Part IV assesses the overruling of Williamson County from the 
standpoint of prominent modern “living constitutionalist” and 
pragmatic theories of precedent.  Here too, it turns out that overruling 
was well-justified.  In sum, the result in Knick is defensible based on a 
wide range of different approaches to stare decisis. 
 
 20. One of the authors has written about these issues in greater detail in an earlier 
article. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 153, 157–71, 181–84. 
 21. For criticism of Knick, see Stewart E. Sterk & Michael Pollack, A Knock on 
Knick’s Revival of Federal Takings Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449281 [https://perma.cc/6YU5-
QB3C]. 
 22. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2186 (2019) (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
 23. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public 
Meaning Approach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (providing a helpful overview of 
such theories). 
 24. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980–89 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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I. WHY WILLIAMSON COUNTY  WAS WRONG 
This Part summarizes the reasons why Williamson County was 
wrong to require takings plaintiffs to “exhaust” remedies in state court 
before filing a claim in federal court.25  The Knick majority was 
therefore justified in eliminating this requirement — setting aside (for 
the moment) the doctrine of precedent.  These reasons are relevant to 
any assessment of arguments that the relevant precedent should be 
preserved for the sake of stare decisis.  Under many theories of stare 
decisis, whether an erroneous precedent should be preserved depends 
in large part on the reasons why it was wrong, and on the relative 
egregiousness of the error.  This Article does not attempt to provide 
anything approaching a complete defense of the reasons for believing 
Williamson County was wrong.26   We seek only to briefly lay out those 
reasons so they can then be  considered in analyzing the stare decisis 
issue. 
 Knick arose from a dispute over alleged centuries-old gravesites.27  
Rose Mary Knick owned a 90-acre farm in the Township of Scott, 
Pennsylvania.28  Members of her family had owned the land since 
1970.29  Beginning in 2008, some other area residents claimed that there 
were old gravesites on the Knick property and sought access to them.  
In December 2012, the Township enacted Ordinance 12-12-20-001, 
which required “[a]ll cemeteries . . . be kept open and accessible to the 
general public during daylight hours.”30 
In April 2013, the Township’s code enforcement officer entered the 
property and concluded that several stones on the land were actually 
gravestones, and therefore, the land qualified as a “cemetery” under 
the ordinance.31  Under the ordinance, Knick would have had to pay 
between $300 and $600 in daily fines for each day the public and 
township enforcement officials did not have daylight access to the 
“cemetery.”32 
 
 25. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
194 (1985)). 
 26. See generally Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–71 (arguing in detail why 
Williamson County was wrongly decided). 
 27. See id. at 155–56. 
 28. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–7, Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019) (No. 17-647). 
 29. See id. at 4. 
 30. Scott Township, Pa., Ordinance 12-12-20-001 § 5 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 31. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 6. 
 32. See id. at 4–7. 
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Knick filed a lawsuit in state court challenging the ordinance, 
arguing that it amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The state court dismissed 
the case on procedural grounds.33  After failing to secure a decision on 
the merits in state court, Knick filed a takings claim in federal court.34  
Citing Williamson County, both the district court and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the case because Knick’s 
takings claim was not ripe for review.35  As the district court ruling 
explained, Williamson County required two prerequisites for an as-
applied takings challenge: 
(1) ‘the government entity charged with implementing the regulations 
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to the property at issue’ (the ‘finality rule’), and (2) the 
plaintiff has unsuccessfully exhausted the state’s procedures for 
seeking ‘just compensation,’ so long as the procedures provided by 
the state were adequate.36 
Because Knick’s claim was a facial challenge to the Township’s 
ordinance, she did not need to satisfy the “finality rule,” but was still 
required to satisfy the “exhaustion” requirement by first seeking just 
compensation in state court in order for her claim to be ripe.37  There 
is little doubt that the lower courts applied Williamson County 
correctly, thereby creating a potential opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to reconsider the second prong of the precedent, which required 
exhaustion of the claim in state court. 
The most obvious reason why Williamson County’s state-exhaustion 
requirement was wrong is that it is at odds with the text of the Fifth 
Amendment.  The relevant part of that text states that “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”38  
As Chief Justice Roberts puts it in his majority opinion in Knick: 
[The Clause] . . . does not say: “[n]or shall private property be taken 
for public use, without an available procedure that will result in 
compensation.”  If a local government takes private property without 
paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment — 
 
 33. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017); Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 2016 WL 4701549, *5–6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016). 
 36. Knick, 2016 WL 4701549 at *5 (quoting Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of 
Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning 
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194–95 (1985)). 
 37. Id.; see also Knick, 862 F.3d at 323. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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just as the Takings Clause says — without regard to subsequent state 
court proceedings.39 
The text of the Takings Clause indicates that the key trigger for 
liability and compensation is the taking itself, not the state court’s 
subsequent possible decision upholding the taking.  During whatever 
period in which the government has taken the property, but failed to 
provide compensation, there is a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Justice Kagan’s counterargument — that “the text does not say: 
‘[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without advance 
or contemporaneous payment of just compensation, notwithstanding 
ordinary procedures’” — ignores the fact that property rights exist in 
time, as well as in space.40  It is a long-established principle of takings 
law that if the government takes private property for only a limited 
period of time, it must still pay just compensation for that period.41  
Under Justice Kagan’s approach, there would be no violation of the 
Takings Clause until “the property owner comes away from the 
government’s compensatory procedure empty-handed.”42 
This inference from the text is backed by the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which “incorporated” the Fifth Amendment 
and all or most of the rest of the Bill of Rights against the states.43  The 
Amendment’s framers sought to ensure that property rights would be 
protected against uncompensated takings by state governments; this 
issue was a major priority of theirs, as they feared that southern states 
would seek to undermine the property rights of African-Americans 
and whites who had sided with the Union during the recently 
concluded Civil War.44 
In addition to being at odds with the text and original meaning, the 
Williamson County “Catch-22” also created a double standard under 
which property rights claimants under the Takings Clause were denied 
access to federal court in situations where access is routinely granted 
 
 39. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170. 
 40. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 41. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 10 (1949) (applying 
that rule); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946) (same); 
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374–75 (1945) (same). For an 
overview of the Court’s jurisprudence on temporary takings, see Daniel L. Siegel & 
Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 480 (2010). 
 42. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 43. For a general account of incorporation and the motivations behind it, see 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–294 
(1998). 
 44. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 160–62. 
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to other types of constitutional claims.45  Many such claims could also 
have been treated as not “ripe” until the plaintiffs had exhausted all 
possible state court remedies.  Examples include suits challenging prior 
restraints on speech and racial and ethnic discrimination in state 
university admissions, among others.46 
Attempts to prove that Williamson County was not an unusual case 
by analogizing it to restrictions on habeas challenges to state court 
violations of criminal defendants’ rights are unpersuasive.  Such 
comparisons run afoul of the fact that the restrictions in question do 
not create a categorical bar to such challenges and are, at least in part, 
authorized by a statute enacted by Congress.47 
Similarly unavailing are oft-heard claims that takings claims should 
be consigned to state court because state judges have special expertise 
on these issues, exceeding that of federal judges.48  Such reasoning 
would justify relegating numerous other constitutional rights claims to 
state court, on the basis of supposedly superior expertise, including free 
speech cases, First Amendment Establishment Clause cases, and 
others.49 
It is sometimes argued that property rights issues are a special case 
because state law defines what qualifies as “property.”50  This theory, 
however, does not give state courts any special expertise advantage 
greater than that which they enjoy in many other cases where the 
 
 45. Id. at 163. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 169–71. We do not, however, mean to suggest that these restrictions 
on habeas claims are justified. We are sympathetic to many of the concerns about them 
raised by critics. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and 
the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the 
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly 
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1219––20 (2015); Lynn Adelman, 
Who Killed Habeas Corpus?, DISSENT 2–3 (2018), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/who-killed-habeas-corpus-bill-clinton-aedpa-
states-rights [https://perma.cc/Z52N-59E4]. 
 48. See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and 
Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial 
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1993); Stewart E. Sterk, The 
Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 226–
28 (2004). 
 49. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 164–65; see also Ilya Somin, Federalism and 
Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 80–86 (2011) [hereinafter Somin, 
Federalism and Property Rights] (criticizing such arguments with respect to 
constitutional property right issues more generally). 
 50. See, e.g., Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187–88 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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outcome may depend in part on interpretations of state and local law.51  
In addition, this point only applies to one term in the Takings Clause 
— “property” — but not to the interpretation of other key terms, 
including “take” and “just compensation.”  These are defined by 
federal constitutional law, and it is their definitions that are at issue in 
many Takings Clause cases, including Knick, where the critical dispute 
was not over whether Knick owned the land in question, but whether 
the government had “taken” her rights.52  Moreover, property rights 
are not solely defined by state law, but also have roots in natural rights 
theory.53 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that access to federal court is 
not just a minor procedural issue, with little or no practical import.  In 
some situations, it is an essential safeguard enabling property owners 
to avoid political bias in state courts.54  It also ensures that a minimum 
floor of federal constitutional rights is enforced throughout the 
nation.55  As Justice Joseph Story noted in the classic 1816 Supreme 
Court decision, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, one of the main reasons why 
federal courts have jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues is “the 
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout 
the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution.”56 
In sum, Williamson County was wrongly decided because it created 
a Catch-22 that violated the text and original meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment and established a blatant double-standard under which 
takings claims were systematically treated worse than other 
constitutional-rights cases.  It also denied takings plaintiffs access to 
federal courts that, in some cases, might be essential to shielding them 
against biased state courts. 
II. KNICK AND THE COURT’S EXISTING PRECEDENT ON 
OVERRULING PRECEDENT 
The Knick majority’s decision to overrule Williamson County is 
consistent with the Court’s own previously stated criteria for overruling 
constitutional precedent.57  We might call that doctrine the Court’s 
 
 51. Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 165; see also Somin, Federalism and Property 
Rights, supra note 49, at 84–86 (offering more extended analysis of this point). 
 52. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 49, at 86. 
 54. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 181–82. 
 55. See id. at 182–83. 
 56. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (Story, J.). 
 57. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 172. 
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“precedent about precedent.”  Although that precedent is not entirely 
clear, Knick is well within its scope. 
A. Williamson County and the Court’s Criteria for Reversal of 
Constitutional Precedent 
The Supreme Court has stated that it will “overrule an erroneously 
decided precedent . . . if: (1) its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by 
subsequent decisions; (2) it has been subject to ‘substantial and 
continuing’ criticism; and (3) it has not induced ‘individual or societal 
reliance’ that counsels against overturning” it.58  Some cases also 
highlight the “workability” of the precedent in question.59 
An additional factor that the Court considers is whether the original 
decision was “well reasoned.”60  Furthermore, as Chief Justice Roberts 
points out in Knick, the doctrine of stare decisis “‘is at its weakest when 
we interpret the Constitution,’ as we did in Williamson County, 
because only this Court or a constitutional amendment can alter our 
holdings.”61 
Williamson County easily fits within these criteria.  That decision 
embedded a double standard against takings claims, which treats them 
less favorably than other constitutional rights claims.62   But that 
approach has been “eroded” by later Supreme Court decisions that 
explicitly caution against treating the Takings Clause — and property 
rights generally — as the “poor relation” of constitutional law.63  
Recent decisions have gradually cut back on other areas where takings 
claims have been disfavored relative to other constitutional rights 
cases.64  In addition, post-Williamson County rulings have held that 
local government land-use regulations can be challenged in federal 
 
 58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 59. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2481 (2018). 
 60. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009). 
 61. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 62. See supra Part I. 
 63. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (holding that there is “no 
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of 
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the 
status of a poor relation”). 
 64. See generally Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of 
Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings 
Clause, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215 (2013) [hereinafter Somin, Two Steps 
Forward] (discussing two notable examples of such recent decisions). 
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court on other constitutional grounds, such as the First Amendment.65  
These developments make Williamson County even more anomalous 
than it was before. 
There is also little doubt that Williamson County has been subject 
to “substantial and continuing” criticism.66  As Chief Justice Roberts 
notes, “[t]he decision has come in for repeated criticism over the years 
from Justices of this Court and many respected commentators.”67  The 
ruling has been the object of widespread criticism by legal scholars who 
decry the Catch-22 problem and other aspects of the ruling.68 
Perhaps more importantly, in a concurring opinion in San Remo 
Hotel, then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that Williamson 
County had severe flaws, was inconsistent with the Court’s treatment 
of other constitutional rights, and “ha[d] created some real anomalies, 
justifying our revisiting the issue.”69  Justice Rehnquist wrote that, 
although he had joined in the Williamson County ruling back in 1985, 
he had since come to believe that the state-litigation requirement of 
that ruling “may have been mistaken.”70  Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence was joined by three other members of the Court: Justices 
 
 65. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–50 (1986) (deciding 
a First Amendment challenge to restrictions on locations of adult businesses). 
 66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 67. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (citing examples). 
 68. For examples of the many critiques, see Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use 
Be Different? Reflections on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v. 
Hamilton Bank, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PERSPECTIVES 471, 473–74 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Michael M. Berger & 
Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court 
Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 
36 URB. L. 671, 673 (2004); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness 
Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 102–03 (2000); David 
Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How 
the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception 
Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 FLA. ST. J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 209 (2003); Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2012–2013 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 245 (2013); R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental 
Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings 
Claims to State Court Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 567 (2015); Ilya Somin, Supreme Court Will Hear Important Property Rights 
Case, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/05/supreme-court-will-hear-important-proper 
[https://perma.cc/N79B-P8VT] [hereinafter Somin, Supreme Court]. 
 69. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351 
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 348. 
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Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas.71  
Justice O’Connor was also on the Court in 1985 and joined in the 
Williamson County majority.  Few Supreme Court decisions have been 
so seriously questioned by four members of the Court, including two 
who initially supported it.72  If this does not qualify as “substantial and 
continuing criticism,” it is hard to imagine what does. 
When it comes to “workability,” the Catch-22 created by the 
combination of Williamson County and San Remo has, as Roberts 
emphasized, made the decisions’ rules “unworkable.”73  If any 
procedural rule qualifies as such, it is one where the very action that is 
a prerequisite to filing a case in federal court also prevents the plaintiff 
from doing so.  The ability of defendants to defeat takings cases by 
“removing” them to federal court, and then getting them dismissed for 
lack of conformity to Williamson County further demonstrates the 
unworkable nature of the state exhaustion requirement.74 
For reasons discussed elsewhere in this Article, the reasoning of 
Williamson County is unusually bad.75  This flaw supports its reversal.  
As Chief Justice Roberts puts it, the decision “was not just wrong.  Its 
reasoning was exceptionally ill-founded and conflicted with much of 
our takings jurisprudence.”76 
The reversal of Williamson County does admittedly upset some 
reliance interests.  Some state and local governments that might 
otherwise have prevailed in takings cases filed in state court will 
probably now lose them in federal court.  However, as Chief Justice 
Roberts points out, the Court does not usually give credence to 
reliance interests that depend on rules that do not “‘serve as a guide to 
lawful behavior’ . . . . Our holding that uncompensated takings violate 
the Fifth Amendment will not expose governments to new liability; it 
will simply allow into federal court takings claims that otherwise would 
have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in state court.”77  If 
an uncompensated restriction on property rights is constitutionally 
valid, the government should be able to defend it successfully in federal 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. We cannot think of another fully comparable example in constitutional law 
between the period when Williamson County was decided, and the present — a 
decision that has been severely criticized by four or more Supreme Court Justices, 
including two of those who were part of the majority that initially decided the case. 
 73. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019). 
 74. See supra Part I. 
 75. See supra Part I; see also Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–59. 
 76. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 77. Id. at 2179 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)). 
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court.  Constitutionally valid policies do not require the protection of 
the Williamson County doctrine, and such protection is not extended 
against any other types of constitutional claims. 
Ultimately, the only “reliance interests” Williamson County 
protects are those of state and local governments that engaged in 
uncompensated takings that would be struck down in federal court but 
upheld by state courts that are biased in their favor or erroneously 
interpret relevant federal takings precedent.  That is not an interest 
anywhere near strong enough to justify continuing to bar an entire 
category of constitutional rights cases from access to federal court. 
Chief Justice Roberts also effectively responds to Justice Kagan’s 
argument that Williamson County should be given the “enhanced” 
form of stare decisis deference usually applied to statutory decisions 
because Congress could reverse it by enacting a statute eliminating the 
“preclusion” trap the Court upheld in San Remo Hotel.78  This would 
only partly fix the problems Williamson County created, as there would 
still be a double standard between takings claims and other 
constitutional rights.  As Roberts points out: 
[T]akings plaintiffs, unlike plaintiffs bringing any other constitutional 
claim, would still have been forced to pursue relief under state law 
before they could bring suit in federal court.  Congress could not have 
lifted that unjustified exhaustion requirement because, under 
Williamson County, a property owner had no federal claim until a 
state court denied him compensation.79 
Moreover, if applied consistently, Justice Kagan’s argument would 
justify giving enhanced status to any precedents establishing judicially 
created barriers to bringing constitutional rights claims in federal court, 
so long as Congress could potentially reverse or mitigate them. 
B. Is Knick at Odds with “Precedent after Precedent after 
Precedent”? 
In addition to defending Williamson County on the grounds of stare 
decisis, Justice Kagan’s dissent argues that the Knick majority 
implicitly overruled numerous precedents going back to the 1890 case 
of Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.80  She contends 
that the majority’s approach “requires declaring precedent after 
 
 78. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 2179. 
 80. 135 U.S. 641 (1890). For Justice Kagan’s discussion of these cases, see Knick, 
139 S. Ct. at 2182 n.1, 2183–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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precedent after precedent wrong.”81  These cases all mandate that the 
Takings Clause “‘does not provide or require that compensation shall 
be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken’” 
provided the government offers “‘reasonable, certain and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation’” after the fact.82 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that these 
cases could be explained by the Court’s unwillingness to provide 
injunctive relief against takings where the property owner was able to 
get compensation.83  Thus, “every one of the cases cited by the dissent 
would come out the same way — the plaintiffs would not be entitled to 
the relief they requested because they could instead pursue a suit for 
compensation.”84  Justice Kagan responds by pointing out that the 
distinction between compensation and injunctive relief “played little or 
no role in our analyses” in those cases.85 
Both Roberts and Kagan ignore a far more significant distinction 
between most of the precedents the latter relies on and cases such as 
Knick and Williamson County.  There is a crucial difference between a 
case where the government concedes there is a taking but merely 
delays paying compensation, and a situation where the government 
denies any taking has occurred at all.  By definition, the latter scenario 
is not a situation where the government provides “reasonable, certain 
and adequate provision for obtaining compensation” after the fact.86  
Compensation from the state is uncertain — and thus also potentially 
inadequate — for the simple reason that the government denies any 
compensation is due at all, and state courts could potentially endorse 
that position even if federal courts might have decided the case 
differently. 
Cases in which both sides agree that compensation is due might be 
characterized simply as disputes over the timing and amount of 
compensation, which can usually be resolved by factual determinations 
about the value of the property in question.  By contrast, disputes over 
whether a taking has occurred at all are textbook examples of litigation 
over whether there has been a violation of federal constitutional law — 
precisely the sort of issue that belongs in federal court, if anything does.  
While a state court could potentially rule against the government on 
the issue of whether a taking has occurred, the same thing could 
 
 81. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 2182 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659). 
 83. See id. at 2176–77. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2185 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 86. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659. 
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happen whenever a state denies that it has violated some other 
constitutional right.  As prominent takings lawyer Robert Thomas asks 
in a critique of Kagan’s opinion: 
[I]sn’t there a big difference between an eminent domain quick take 
where the government occupies now, with the corresponding 
recognition of the absolute obligation to pay whatever the court later 
determines is just compensation, and a regulatory taking where the 
government is exercising some other power, and absolutely denies 
that it needs to pay anything?87 
A close look at the pre-Williamson County cases cited by Justice 
Kagan shows that all cases brought against state and local governments 
(and some brought against the federal government) were in fact cases 
where compensation was “certain” because the government had 
already conceded a taking had occurred and payment was due.  In 
Cherokee Nation, the 1890 case to which Kagan traces the doctrine in 
question, Congress mandated that “full compensation shall be made to 
the owner for all property to be taken” for the construction of a 
railroad that would pass through land owned by Native American 
tribes.88  Since Congress had already authorized compensation for the 
land taken for the railroad, the Court ruled that “this provision is 
sufficiently reasonable, certain and adequate to secure the just 
compensation to which the owner is entitled.”89  The key point, 
however, is that “the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and 
adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy 
is disturbed.”90  There can be no such advance assurance of 
“reasonable, certain, and adequate” compensation in a case where the 
government denies that any compensation is due in the first place. 
Virtually all the other cases cited by Justice Kagan are similar.  
Those brought against state and local governments (and some against 
the federal government) involve scenarios where the government 
conceded in advance that compensation is due, and the only issue was 
its timing or amount.91  Three cases were brought against the federal 
 
 87. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part IV: Why Not Let Sleeping Dogs Lie? 
The Dissent and Stare Decisis, INVERSE CONDEMNATION BLOG (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/06/knick-analysis-
part-iv.html [https://perma.cc/Z63T-HUG4]. 
 88. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. See generally Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 366–70 (1930) (state recognized 
duty to compensate and enacted legislation to do so for land taken for a railroad); 
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677–78 (1923) (city commits to providing 
compensation to owners of land taken for the acquisition of water); Albert Hanson 
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government in situations where the latter denied a taking had 
occurred.92  But a takings claim against the federal government must 
be heard in federal court, regardless of the issue involved.93  And if the 
condemning authority refuses to pay at the time of the taking, the 
remedy will have to be an award of compensation paid after the fact, 
regardless of exactly which federal court hears the case, and at which 
time. 
Thus, such cases do not raise the possibility of denying access to 
federal court for a federal constitutional claim, and do not change the 
nature of the compensation remedy successful plaintiffs stand to 
receive.  As the Supreme Court noted in one of these decisions, “if the 
authorized action in this instance does constitute a taking of property 
for which there must be just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, the Government has impliedly promised to pay that 
compensation and has afforded a remedy for its recovery by a suit in 
the Court of Claims.”94  The same point applies to Kagan’s citation of 
cases involving takings claims brought against the federal government 
under the Tucker Act, which requires such cases to be brought in the 
Federal Court of Claims.95 
 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1923) (government agreed in 
advance to provide compensation for land taken by eminent domain); Hays v. Port of 
Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 234–38 (1920) (city formally asserted title over the owner’s 
property, thereby essentially conceding that the property had been taken); Bragg v. 
Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919) (government recognized obligation to compensate owners 
for land taken for purposes of repairing an adjoining road); Madisonville Traction Co. 
v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 242–43, 251–54 (1905) (state authorized 
compensation for the use of eminent domain to condemn property for a railroad); 
Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 502–04 (1903) (state legislature recognized liability 
and provide compensation for the taking of property by eminent domain, and had the 
power to impose that liability on the City of Boston despite lack of “technical” 
estoppel); Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 565–68 (1898) (state 
recognized obligation to compensate for damage to property that state law treated as 
the equivalent “condemnation” of property interests for the construction of railroad 
tracks); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400–02 (1895) (state recognized duty to 
compensate owners for the takingand allocation of funds for that purpose). These cases 
are all cited in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2182 n.1 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 92. See Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21–23 (1940); Hurley v. 
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengensellschaft, 224 U.S. 
290, 305–06 (1912). 
 93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011) (establishing jurisdiction over such claims in 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims). 
 94. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21. 
 95. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing several such 
cases). 
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Kagan’s reliance on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
cases brought against state and local governments is problematic for an 
additional reason.  Those cases were decided before the Supreme 
Court recognized that the Takings Clause (and the rest of the Bill of 
Rights) was “incorporated” against the states.96  As a result, takings 
claims brought against state and local governments in federal court 
could only be litigated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, utilizing the Court’s so-called “substantive” due process 
doctrine.97  During this era, takings cases decided under the Due 
Process Clause were often litigated under rules that gave greater 
deference to the government than was applied to those brought under 
the Takings Clause (which could only be used against the federal 
government).98  Thus, it should not be assumed the former cases 
represent the Court’s considered judgment of how takings claims 
against states and localities should be handled if the Takings Clause 
had applied to them. 
In his concurring opinion in Knick, Justice Thomas went further 
than Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, arguing that: 
The Fifth Amendment does not merely provide a damages remedy to 
a property owner willing to “shoulder the burden of securing 
compensation” after the government takes property without paying 
for it.  Instead, it makes just compensation a “prerequisite” to the 
government’s authority to “tak[e] property for public use.”  A 
“purported exercise of the eminent-domain power” is therefore 
“invalid” unless the government “pays just compensation before or at 
the time of its taking.”99 
Justice Thomas, therefore, rejects the “‘sue me’ approach to the 
Takings Clause” under which the government is free to undertake 
policies that take private property without paying compensation in 
advance or simultaneously with the taking.100  Unlike the majority 
opinion, Thomas’s argument probably would require overruling a 
substantial number of pre-Williamson County precedents holding that 
the Takings Clause does not require advance or contemporaneous 
compensation.101 
 
 96. For a discussion of the evidence indicating lack of incorporation during this 
period and why it matters, see ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF 
NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 50–51, 123–26 (rev. ed. 2016). 
 97. See id. at 123–26 (discussing this distinction and its importance). 
 98. See id. at 50–51, 123–24. 
 99. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra notes 80–100 and accompanying text. 
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Practically speaking, however, the difference between Justice 
Thomas’s approach and the majority’s will usually be modest, at most.  
Either way, government regulators will sometimes violate the Takings 
Clause even if they try, in good faith, to avoid doing so.  Regardless, 
the practical remedy for any constitutional rights violation would be a 
lawsuit for compensation, filed after the fact. 102 
III. KNICK AND ORIGINALIST THEORIES OF PRECEDENT 
Knick’s reversal of Williamson County is also amply justified under 
theories of stare decisis advanced by leading originalists.  A key reason 
for this conclusion is that the precedent in question has no originalist 
justification, and indeed the Williamson County Court did not even 
attempt to provide one. 
Originalists have proposed several different approaches to dealing 
with wrongly decided precedent.  Some argue that precedents that 
conflict with original meaning should get little or no judicial 
deference.103  Others are willing to make exceptions for flawed 
precedents that are deeply entrenched in the fabric of society.  Neither 
of these approaches justifies retaining Williamson County. 
A. Theories That Reject All or Nearly All Deference to Non-
Originalist Precedents 
From the standpoint of theories that reject all or nearly all judicial 
deference to incorrect non-originalist precedents, it is fairly obvious 
that Williamson County deserved to be overruled, assuming it was 
 
 102. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument 
that government regulators should be able to pursue regulatory programs free of the 
threat of injunction). One potential difference is that Justice Thomas’s theory might 
allow injunctive relief in some situations where Justice Roberts’s would not. But it is 
far from clear that there would be any significant number of such cases. As Justice 
Thomas notes, “[i]njunctive relief is not available when an adequate remedy exists at 
law. And even when relief is appropriate for a particular plaintiff, it does not follow 
that a court may enjoin or invalidate an entire regulatory ‘program.’” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 103. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent 
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2007); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case 
Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24–25 (1994); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
289, 291 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (arguing that we should be 
“documentarians first; and doctrinalists second” thereby generally privileging “the 
amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical experiences 
that birthed and rebirthed the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures 
organizing the document” over judicial precedent). 
564 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
flawed in the way  we and other critics have described.104  The state 
exhaustion requirement is, as Knick concluded, at odds with the text of 
the Fifth Amendment, and it also conflicts with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights against state and local governments.105 
Professor Randy Barnett argues that otherwise-flawed precedent 
might still deserve deference in the “construction zone,” where the 
issues involved have to do with the implementation of “vague” aspects 
of the text and application of the text to complicated factual situations, 
rather than the construal of the text’s core meaning.106  This distinction 
is unlikely to save Williamson County.  The state-exhaustion 
requirement was, in fact, at odds with the text of the Fifth Amendment 
itself, not merely some aspect of the implementation in the 
“construction zone.”107  Moreover, a Catch-22 that systematically bars 
a right from being vindicated in federal court is at odds with the central 
purpose of the right in question — and with the goal behind the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the right against state and 
local governments.108  It, therefore, goes against what Barnett would 
call the “core meaning” of the right in question, and would not qualify 
as “good faith construction.”109   
He further emphasizes that “construction” is only permissible in 
situations where the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision is 
too “vague” to resolve the issue directly, and must be done in a way 
that “furthers the constitutional principles” underlying the provision in 
question.110  Williamson County fails both of these tests.  The Takings 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment are not too vague to resolve 
the issue of when a “taking” has occurred, and the Williamson County 
 
 104. See supra Part I. 
 105. See supra Part I. 
 106. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical 
as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005). On the distinction between 
“interpretation” and “construction,” see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (rev. ed. 2014); see also KEITH 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter 
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (2018); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 108 
(2010). 
 107. See supra Part I. 
 108. See supra Part I. 
 109. See BARNETT, supra note 106, at 124; Barnett & Bernick, supra note 106, at 32–
36. 
 110. See BARNETT, supra note 106, at 128–30. 
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Catch-22 is most definitely at odds with the constitutional principles 
these provisions are supposed to vindicate.111 
In a recent concurring opinion in Gamble v. United States, Justice 
Clarence Thomas, one of the Court’s leading originalists, argued that 
“the Court’s typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not 
comport with our judicial duty under Article III because it elevates 
demonstrably erroneous decisions — meaning decisions outside the 
realm of permissible interpretation — over the text of the Constitution 
and other duly enacted federal law.”112  He instead suggests that courts 
should only respect possibly erroneous precedent if its “traditional 
tools of legal interpretation show that the earlier decision adopted a 
textually permissible interpretation of the law,” though even then 
deference to erroneous precedent is not mandatory.113  By this, Justice 
Thomas clearly means that only precedents that are defensible based 
on originalist methodology can be maintained in the face of strong 
evidence that they were wrongly decided.114  Similarly, Professor Lee 
Strang argues that only originalist precedent deserves deference.115  
Larry Solum also suggests that precedent may have greater force in 
situations “when the prior decision involved a good faith attempt to 
determine the original meaning of the constitutional text,” as opposed 
to those “that ignored original meaning or gave decisive weight to 
policy judgments about desirable outcomes.”116 
From Justice Thomas’s and Strang’s standpoint, the key flaw in 
Williamson County is the Court’s failure to attempt to square the state-
exhaustion requirement with the text of the Fifth Amendment.  Both 
in the Court’s opinion and in justifications put forward subsequently 
by defenders of the ruling, the only rationales offered are pragmatic 
concerns and non-originalist doctrinal considerations.117  Thus, it is not 
surprising that Justice Thomas voted with the Knick majority, and 
 
 111. See supra Part I. 
 112. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 1984. 
 114. Id. at 1986. 
 115. See generally Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged 
Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1764–65 (2010). 
 116. Solum, supra note 23, at 466. 
 117. These include the ripeness theory underlying Williamson County and various 
pragmatic arguments to the effect that state courts are better suited to handle taking 
cases than federal courts. See Somin, Knick, supra note 2, at 157–71, 181–87 (for an 
overview and critique). 
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indeed authored a concurring opinion advocating going further in 
overruling precedent than the majority did.118 
Prominent originalist legal scholar and judge Amy Coney Barrett 
similarly advocates for only a “weak” presumption in favor of retaining 
precedent in constitutional cases, particularly when the precedent in 
question conflicts with the judge’s own methodological priors.119  She 
contends that it would be both unwise and unrealistic to demand more 
stringent adherence to precedent,120 with the exception of a few 
“superprecedents.”121 
B. Theories That Permit Retention of Wrong, but Deeply 
Entrenched Precedents 
Some originalists are willing to carve out a larger space for retaining 
flawed precedents than those who reject the idea almost entirely.  In 
their influential book Originalism and the Good Constitution, John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that originalist judges should 
immunize two types of erroneous precedents from overruling: those 
whose reversal would entail “enormous costs” to society, and those 
that are so “entrenched” that they have broad enough political support 
to have been enacted as constitutional amendments had the courts not 
preempted the amendment process with an incorrect interpretation of 
the existing Constitution.122   Neither of these criteria can save 
Williamson County. 
It is fairly obvious that overruling Williamson County will not lead 
to anything approaching the kinds of “enormous costs” McGinnis and 
Rappaport have in mind.  They envision costs on the scale of those that 
might be endured if the Court were suddenly to invalidate Social 
Security or the use of paper money as legal tender, on originalist 
grounds, thereby potentially creating large-scale social and economic 
upheaval.123  They also suggest that “enormous costs” might justify 
keeping an erroneous precedent in place in any situations where 
 
 118. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2180–81 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). See Section II.B for discussion of Justice Thomas’s opinion. 
 119. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 1711, 1714–15 (2013). 
 120. Id. at 1721. 
 121. See Section III.B for a discussion of this aspect of Judge Barrett’s position. 
 122. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 179–83 (2013); see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against 
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overturning it would require “a large number of programs” to be struck 
down, thereby forcing the legislature to undertake “immediate action” 
to avert a crisis.124 
Overruling Williamson County does not, in and of itself, require 
invalidation of any government programs.  It merely allows cases 
challenging some of these programs to proceed in federal rather than 
state court.  While some policies are likely to be ruled takings in federal 
court that a state court would have upheld,125 it is highly unlikely this 
will result in any “enormous cost” or social crisis.  If the programs in 
question are truly vital, the state or local government in question can 
simply allocate money to pay compensation.  In some situations, 
ensuring compensation could strengthen the security of property 
rights, and thereby actually benefit society by providing stronger 
incentives for development and investment.  The need for secure 
property rights is one of the main insights of modern development 
economics.126  Requiring compensation could also help incentivize 
state and local governments to consider the costs and benefits of their 
regulatory programs more carefully.127  Far from imposing “enormous” 
social costs, the reversal of Williamson County could potentially create 
substantial benefits. 
It is even more unlikely that Williamson County should have been 
preserved because it enjoyed such broad support that a constitutional 
amendment could have been enacted to enshrine its principles.  The 
passage of a constitutional amendment requires a broad political 
consensus and strong popular support in order to overcome the 
supermajority requirements of Article V of the Constitution by 
securing the support of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and 
three-quarters of state legislatures.128  McGinnis and Rappaport 
emphasize that their theory of “entrenched precedent” requires broad 
enough popular support to make the passage of an amendment “more 
likely than not.”129 
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To our knowledge, there is no public opinion polling on Williamson 
County or its overruling by Knick.  Indeed, it is highly likely that most 
of the public is completely unaware of the controversy surrounding 
these two cases,130 which is largely confined to specialists in property 
law and land-use policy.  Significantly, the reversal of Williamson 
County was not met by any widespread public outcry, nor have there 
been any significant efforts to try to alter Knick through legislation, 
such as new laws limiting federal court jurisdiction over takings cases. 
A few commentators and officials worried that it might endanger 
some land-use regulations, especially in highly restrictive states, such 
as California.131  Rhode Island Democratic Senator Sheldon 
Whitehouse wrote an op-ed denouncing the decision as “part of a 
pattern of 73 cases through the 2018 term where the Republican-
appointed justices delivered big wins for big Republican donor 
interests.”132  But even these critics did not propose to reverse Knick 
by constitutional amendment, nor is there anything even remotely 
approaching a broad popular movement to do so. 
If Williamson County and Knick somehow did attract widespread 
public attention, it is unlikely that a supermajority would prefer the 
doctrine of the former.  Many voters might reject the idea that an entire 
category of constitutional property-rights claims should be denied 
access to federal court — a possibility consistent with the strong 
negative public reaction against the Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. 
New London.133  Most of the public perceived that ruling as gutting 
protection for property rights against unscrupulous local governments 
by allowing the government to take property for private “economic 
development.”134  If Williamson County were better known, it 
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probably would not have attracted as much opposition as Kelo.  Unlike 
Kelo, it is a procedural rule that does not by itself deprive property 
owners of substantive rights, even though it may make such deprivation 
more likely in some cases.135  But it seems even more unlikely that 
Williamson County could ever generate the widespread supermajority 
support needed to pass a constitutional amendment based on it. 
An important new article by Professor Will Baude on 
“constitutional liquidation” argues that the meaning of 
“indeterminate” constitutional text can be “liquidated” over time if 
there is a longstanding “course of deliberate practice” favoring a given 
approach, and if there has been a “constitutional settlement” in which 
the “losing side” ultimately “gave up” and acquiesced in the 
interpretation it once opposed.136  Baude’s approach focuses primarily 
on “liquidation” by “practice” in the political branches of 
government.137  But this reasoning presumably applies to judicial 
precedents that receive that kind of support. 
Under Baude’s criteria, the Court was amply justified in overruling 
Williamson County.  Even assuming the Takings Clause is 
indeterminate on the issues at stake in Williamson County,138 that 
precedent does not meet Baude’s criteria for “liquidation.”  And even 
if there has been a consistent pattern of practice, the opponents of the 
ruling never acquiesced in any kind of “settlement.”  Far from giving 
up, they continued to oppose Williamson County, and sought its 
reversal — ultimately successfully.139 
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, arguably the nation’s most 
prominent originalist for many years, avowed that “stare decisis is not 
part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”140  
This raises  an obvious question: when does the exception apply?  
Scalia never developed a systematic answer to that query.  If stare 
decisis requires near-absolute deference to precedent, then Williamson 
County should have been preserved — along with virtually every other 
Supreme Court precedent, no matter how flawed.  However, Scalia’s 
writings and opinions suggest that he did not, in fact, practice absolute 
adherence to precedent.141  The point of the “pragmatic exception,” in 
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his view, was to prevent originalism from becoming “too strong to 
swallow.”142  Thus, the doctrine was meant to insulate from reversal 
such hallowed precedents as Marbury v. Madison, even if historical 
research reveals that they are wrong as a matter of original meaning.143  
Otherwise, originalism would have — for Scalia — the unacceptable 
consequence of reversing precedent backed by a broad societal 
consensus, and thereby become unpalatable to modern jurists.144 
This consideration, however, would not protect precedents that are 
highly controversial, or at least do not enjoy the support of a strong 
consensus.  Few would argue that reversing precedents of the caliber 
of Williamson County would make originalism inherently 
unacceptable, even if they might believe the precedent in question 
should have been retained.  In cases where the precedents at issue were 
relatively recent and highly controversial, Scalia was often willing to 
overrule those he thought seriously wrong — most notably in cases 
involving abortion and affirmative action.145 
To the extent there is a consistent pattern to Scalia’s approach to 
precedent, it is that he was willing to overrule non-originalist decisions 
that he thought were seriously wrong and that did not have the support 
of a broad societal consensus.  He only seemed unwilling to reverse 
what he considered to be incorrect precedent in cases where it would 
make originalism too bitter a pill to “swallow.”146  Scalia’s theory seems 
to be entirely compatible with overruling Williamson County, 
assuming that the decision was wrong for the reasons critics have 
claimed.147 
Judge Robert Bork, another leading originalist jurist of the same 
generation as Scalia, indicated in 1989 that a “clearly wrong” precedent 
“should not be overruled” if it is “thoroughly embedded in our national 
life.”148  Judge Amy Coney Barrett endorsed a similar notion in a 2013 
article, where she suggested that such “superprecedents” have 
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effectively been taken out of judicial hands by “the people,” and thus 
cannot be reversed.149  These positions resemble the view we have 
extrapolated from Scalia’s writings, and also partly prefigure McGinnis 
and Rappaport’s theory that originalist judges should not reverse 
“entrenched” precedents.150  It seems obvious that Williamson County 
does not qualify as such a “thoroughly embedded” precedent.151 
Retaining Williamson County might have been justified under 
theories holding that long-established precedent should almost always 
trump original meaning, even if the precedent in question is seriously 
wrong.152  But this approach is at odds with the views of most 
prominent originalists.  And it would require condemning nearly all 
efforts to reverse non-originalist precedents that originalists decry, not 
just Williamson County. 
Even some of those who advocate a strong form of deference to 
erroneous precedent nonetheless concede that overruling might be 
justified in situations where a precedent “has become unworkable 
or . . . conflicts with other precedent.”153  As we have seen, Williamson 
County suffers from both these flaws.154 
IV. ASSESSING KNICK UNDER LIVING-CONSTITUTION THEORIES OF 
PRECEDENT 
Overruling Williamson County would also be compatible with the 
living Constitution theories of precedent.  Originalism has been 
described as “the antithesis of the idea that we have a living 
constitution.”155  However, examining how living-constitution theories 
apply to what we assume was an erroneous decision in Williamson 
County reveals common ground.  For purposes of this analysis, we use 
the term “living constitution” to describe all relevant non-originalist 
theories of precedent, though we recognize that such theories differ 
among themselves on the extent of change in constitutional 
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interpretation that their advocates consider appropriate.  We consider 
Knick under the influential living-constitution approach to precedent 
derived from the common-law method, and also a number of other 
living-constitution approaches.  We first explore the common-law 
method primarily as advocated by Professor David Strauss.  We then 
go on to discuss additional living-constitution approaches as they relate 
to Knick.  These theories include Professor Lawrence Lessig’s theory 
of constitutional fidelity through translation, Professor Richard 
Fallon’s call for legal legitimacy using the reflective equilibrium theory, 
Professor Randy Kozel’s “second-best stare decisis” theory, and 
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt’s “reasoned elaboration” theory for 
overruling. 
While these theories have their differences, all place substantial 
value on the workability of the precedent in question, the quality of the 
Court’s reasoning, and the extent to which it has engendered strong 
“reliance” interests.  On these criteria, Williamson County was a 
precedent ripe for reversal. 
A. The Common-Law Approach 
The common-law approach to precedent as it relates to the 
overruling of Williamson County by Knick is described in this 
subsection.  First, we discuss the general concept of precedent that is 
based on common-law tradition.  We then apply the virtues identified 
by Strauss as found in the common-law approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  The concept of precedent is said to be “‘[t]he most 
distinctive characteristic of English law and American law’” based on 
the common-law tradition.156  Common-law constitutionalism — which 
holds that courts should interpret the Constitution by using methods 
similar to those used by judges in developing the common-law — is one 
of the most significant living-constitution approaches to constitutional 
interpretation.157 
The common-law method requires balancing the value of adhering 
to tradition and precedent against retaining a rule of law that is 
mistaken or unworkable.158  This tension was described by Justice 
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Louis Brandeis as “reflecting the competing values of leaving the law 
‘settled’ and getting the law ‘right.’”159 
For reasons discussed earlier in this Article,160 Williamson County 
got the law “wrong.”  However, the ripeness requirement found in the 
second prong of Williamson County was not really “settled” such that 
takings claim litigants had adapted to this requirement, and its 
overruling would disrupt the application of the law in practice.  In fact, 
litigants, judges, and scholars continued to criticize the ripeness 
requirement and attempted to find ways to work around the law.161  
Therefore, the tension between leaving the law settled and getting it 
right was less severe than might have been the case with more widely 
accepted precedents. 
Relevant to Knick’s claim that her property had been “taken” by the 
Township ordinance, regard for precedent is particularly strong in 
property rights, contractual obligations, and commercial transactions 
based on the likelihood of precedential reliance.162  Overruling a rule 
of property precedent “may raise both reliance-based hardship and 
takings concerns that are not present (or not as strongly present) in the 
run-of-the-mill case.”163 
Unlike the concerns animating the robust application of precedent 
in cases where an owner may be deprived of a property interest by 
overturning a prior decision, the overruling of Williamson County 
actually increased the protection of private property rights.  After 
Knick, property owners are able to file a takings claim in federal court 
without being required to first exhaust their claim in state court and 
face preclusion in a federal forum. 
How then does a common-law living constitutionalist deal with the 
problem of precedent at issue in Knick where the Court must decide 
whether to follow its earlier ruling in Williamson County?  Professor 
David Strauss, the leading academic proponent of common-law 
constitutionalism, explains that the living Constitution should not be 
viewed as “an invitation to the people in power to do what they want,” 
but instead can “be based on an important set of virtues: intellectual 
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humility, a sense of the complexity of the problems faced by our 
society, a respect for the accumulated wisdom of the past, and a 
willingness to rethink when necessary and when consistent with those 
virtues.”164 
These virtues can be found in the common-law approach to 
constitutional interpretation, which relies on “over two centuries of 
experience grappling with the fundamental issues — constitutional 
issues — that arise in a large, complex, diverse, changing society.”165  
Although some of the lessons learned may become part of the text of 
the Constitution through amendments, the “precedents, traditions, and 
understandings” from our experience informs how the Constitution 
operates in practice as our living Constitution.166  Strauss also 
emphasizes the importance of the workability of the precedent in 
question, and its consistency with other, more recent precedents.167  In 
addition, he argues that common-law constitutional jurists can 
sometimes take account of considerations of “fairness” and “social 
policy,” albeit only in limited ways.168 
Strauss also points out some areas of practice in which constitutional 
law contradicts the text of the Constitution.169  For example, he claims 
that following the text of the Constitution would allow: a state to have 
an established church; states to disenfranchise certain people based on 
being poor or gay because the right to vote is not protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause; the federal government to discriminate on 
the basis of race or sex because the Equal Protection clause only 
applies to the states; and several other anomalies.170  Instead, Strauss 
argues that “[i]n most litigated cases, constitutional law resembles the 
common-law much more closely than it resembles a text-based system” 
and that the text of the Constitution “will be most important when 
there are not a lot of subsequent precedents ‘interpreting’ it.”171  
Therefore, Strauss believes “that provisions of the Constitution 
function roughly in the same way as precedents in a common-law 
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system” and thus allows for an evolutionary understanding of 
constitutional law based on the common-law approach.172 
The Straussian virtues of “intellectual humility” and a “willingness 
to rethink when necessary”173 were on full display when the justices 
who joined the Williamson County decision voiced criticism of the 
state exhaustion requirement in a subsequent opinion, San Remo 
Hotel.  As discussed in Section II.A, in a concurring opinion in San 
Remo Hotel, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Williamson 
County had severe flaws, was inconsistent with the Court’s treatment 
of other constitutional rights, and “ha[d] created some real anomalies, 
justifying our revisiting the issue.”174  Justice Rehnquist wrote that 
although he had joined the majority in Williamson County, he had 
since come to believe that the state-litigation requirement of that ruling 
“may have been mistaken.”175  Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was 
joined by three other members of the Court: Justices Anthony 
Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas.176  Justice 
O’Connor had also joined the Williamson County majority in 1985.177  
Thus, the virtues underpinning the common-law constitutionalist 
theory of precedent support the overruling of Williamson County. 
Strauss’s criterion of workability also supports overruling 
Williamson County.  The Knick Court recognized the complexity of 
the problems faced by litigants bringing takings claims and gave respect 
for the accumulated wisdom of the past three decades as the 
Williamson County ruling has been the object of widespread criticism 
by legal scholars.178  The Catch-22 problem created by Williamson 
County and subsequent rulings demonstrated the fundamentally 
unworkable nature of the decision.179  The fact that takings defendants 
could “remove” cases to federal court and then use the Williamson 
County ripeness rule to get them dismissed further underscored its 
unworkability.180 
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The ripeness requirement in Williamson County created a complex 
litigation problem for those trying to bring an inverse condemnation 
claim under the Fifth Amendment.  As noted above, the pre-
Williamson County cases cited by Justice Kagan in her dissent were 
cases where compensation was “certain” because the government had 
already conceded that a taking had occurred and payment was due.181  
By contrast, inverse condemnation litigation requires a court to 
determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred.182  It is the federal 
court system that has developed a uniform approach to determining 
whether a regulation has gone “too far” such that it is a taking requiring 
just compensation.183 
Finally, to the extent that considerations of “fairness” and “social 
policy” are relevant to the overruling of precedent, these too weigh in 
favor of the result in Knick.  Barring an entire category of federal 
constitutional claims from access to federal court was manifestly unfair, 
and also put many takings plaintiffs at risk of being the victims of 
biased or otherwise flawed state courts.184  It also undermined the 
fundamental principle of ensuring a nation-wide minimum floor for 
constitutional rights protected by the Bill of Rights.185 
In so far as reliance interests should be considered as elements of 
fairness or social policy, those protected by Williamson County were 
nowhere near strong enough to justify retaining a seriously flawed 
precedent.186  The reliance interests impacted by Knick could only be 
claimed by the government in its attempt to regulate property owners 
without paying just compensation.187  By requiring litigants asserting 
inverse condemnation claims to seek a remedy in state court before 
proceeding to federal court, state and local officials could delay or 
avoid paying just compensation for excessive regulation by arguing for 
dismissal on ripeness grounds if the plaintiff brought a claim in federal 
court, or removing the case from state to federal court and then moving 
to dismiss.188  If we accept the view that state courts will often be 
friendlier to local government and officials based on political affinity, 
property owners may prefer to have their claims heard in federal court, 
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particularly since the contours of regulatory takings law has been 
developed in the federal system.189 
B. Other Living-Constitution Approaches to Overruling Precedent 
Other living-constitution approaches to overruling precedent also 
weigh in favor of the Court’s decision in Knick.  The next four 
subsections explore how these four approaches support the overruling 
of Williamson County and include Professor Lawrence Lessig’s theory 
of constitutional fidelity through translation, Professor Richard 
Fallon’s call for legal legitimacy using the reflective equilibrium theory, 
and Professor Randy Kozel’s “second-best stare decisis” theory.  The 
Section concludes with a discussion of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt’s 
“reasoned elaboration” theory for overruling as applied to Knick. 
i. Interpretive Fidelity to Constitutional Meaning 
Professor Lawrence Lessig argues that constitutional interpretation 
must be grounded in fidelity.  On this view, “the Court [should] read 
the Constitution in light of the current interpretive context so as to 
preserve its original meaning.”190  Translating a text into the current 
context requires interpretive fidelity to constitutional meaning.191  
Constitutional interpretation also requires fidelity to role, which 
originated in the early constitutional law cases of Marbury v. Madison 
(1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).192  In Marbury, according 
to Lessig, Chief Justice John Marshall understood that in order to 
secure the Supreme Court’s authority “to hold Congress to the 
Constitution, and the president to the law and Constitution,” it would 
need to set precedents to secure its power over time.193  This protection 
of the Court into the future illustrates fidelity to role.194  In McCulloch, 
the fidelity to role differs from the “external and foundational” 
concern of Marbury and instead addresses the “internal and 
pragmatic” concern that the Court should not be in the “business of 
evaluating whether a law is really necessary or not.”195 
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Chief Justice Marshall broadly interpreted the Constitution’s 
Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to establish a national 
bank.196  Here, on Lessig’s account, fidelity to role was served by 
ensuring the Court would be able to apply the law consistently.  By 
allowing Congress to decide what is necessary, the Court avoids 
drawing the lines between what is “really necessary” and what is not, 
thus reducing the possibility of artificial distinctions that make 
precedent difficult to follow.197 
The Court adheres to fidelity of role “internally” by avoiding 
conflicting decisions and “externally” by maintaining a stable 
institution to decide future cases.198  The external constraints on 
fidelity to role dictate that courts should proceed cautiously when 
tracking the “evolution of social meanings so as not to lead a trend, 
even if they believe the trend is correct, such as in the case of 
marriage.”199  Recognizing that “our tradition has allowed the Supreme 
Court a jurisdiction to say what the social meaning is,” Lessig argues 
that “social and political context inevitably and appropriately plays a 
significant role, especially for courts within a democracy.”200  This 
context is a constraint on constitutionalism as well as “an ongoing 
assurance that the Constitution will not become too remote.”201 
As discussed above in Part III, Williamson County did not present a 
significant constitutional interpretation problem because the Court 
failed to attempt to square the state-exhaustion requirement with the 
text of the Fifth Amendment.  Both in the Court’s opinion and in 
justifications put forward subsequently by defenders of the ruling, the 
only rationales offered are pragmatic concerns and non-originalist 
doctrinal considerations.202  Thus, Lessig’s call for fidelity to meaning 
is not relevant to Knick’s overruling of precedent.  However, Lessig’s 
call for fidelity to role presents external constraints on courts and 
encourages them to go slow in tracking changes occurring in the social 
and the political context. 
The Williamson County precedent from 1985 prevailed for decades, 
frustrating property owners and critics of the state exhaustion ripeness 
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requirement.203  It was questioned by four justices in 2005 in the San 
Remo Hotel decision, when the logical outcome of the requirement 
resulted in the Court holding that a final decision in a takings case from 
a state court precluded re-litigation of the same issue in federal 
court.204  In 1997 and  again in 2013, the Court recast the state 
exhaustion requirement as a “prudential” ripeness rule, rather than as 
an element of a takings claim.205  To make matters worse, some state 
and local governments defended against takings claims by removing 
the state case to federal court and then successfully moving for 
dismissal based on the property owner’s failure to “exhaust” state court 
remedies — a failure caused by the defendant’s own decision to remove 
the case.206  With over 30 years of litigation frustration for property 
owners, removal mischief perpetrated by state and local government 
defendants, and criticism from scholars and practitioners, the Knick 
Court was true to its fidelity to role.  It allowed the mistaken precedent 
to evolve over three decades before overturning it, thus promoting the 
external aspects of maintaining a stable institution to decide future 
cases. 
ii. The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy: The Reflective Equilibrium 
Theory 
In reframing the debates propounded by “originalists” and “living 
constitutionalists,” Professor Richard H. Fallon focuses on the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s authority and states “the Court’s 
principal function is to determine what prior authorities — and, in 
particular, the Constitution — have decided or established, and to 
apply the dictates of prior authorities to the cases that come before 
it.”207  Fallon identifies three major considerations that bear on the 
Court’s legitimacy in cases where we believe the justices have made a 
mistake.  First, the justices must “exhibit reasonable judgment about 
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what they can do within the bounds of the law.  Second, the [j]ustices 
must exhibit good, or at least reasonable, practical[,] and moral 
judgment.”208  Third, the justices must “support their judgments with 
arguments that they advance in good faith.”209 
In the Knick decision, Justice Roberts analyzed several factors that 
are similar to the considerations Fallon identified to support the 
Court’s legitimacy in overruling a mistaken precedent.210  In Part IV of 
the opinion, Justice Roberts addressed the question of “whether we 
should overrule Williamson County, or whether stare decisis counsels 
in favor of adhering to the decision, despite its error.”211  Chief Justice 
Roberts exhibited reasonable judgment about what the Court can do 
within the bounds of the law by using factors identified by the Court to 
decide whether to overrule a past decision.212  These factors included 
“the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, 
its consistency with other related decisions, . . . and reliance on the 
decision.”213 
The Court analyzed each factor in detail and concluded with the 
statement, “[i]n light of all the foregoing, the dissent cannot, with 
respect, fairly maintain its extreme assertions regarding our application 
of the principle of stare decisis.”214  This concluding statement indicates 
that the majority justices believed they were exhibiting good practical 
and moral judgment in overruling Williamson County and that they 
had supported their judgment with strong, good-faith arguments 
sufficient to address the dissent’s concerns. 
Building on the practice-based theory of law from Professor H.L.A. 
Hart, Fallon sets out seven rules of constitutional practice that bind the 
Supreme Court as follows215: 
1. The Justices’ rulings must be “mandated by or 
consistent with” the authority of the Constitution but 
understanding that the Constitution requires interpretation.216  
As we expressed previously, we believe that the Knick decision 
is consistent with the Fifth Amendment and that overruling 
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Williamson County did not require constitutional 
interpretation. 
2. The justices must sometimes choose from various 
rules of interpretation to achieve legal validity, such as choosing 
precedential meaning over original meaning.217  The Knick 
decision did not require the justices to choose precedential 
meaning over original meaning as the state-exhaustion doctrine 
from Williamson County was not a constitutional interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
3. The justices “should maintain reasonable stability in 
constitutional doctrine” even when they do not agree with the 
reasoning and the resulting rule.218  The ripeness doctrine 
espoused by the Williamson County decision caused instability 
in litigating Fifth Amendment constitutional claims over the last 
three decades, and its overruling should return stability to 
takings claims. 
4. The justices must maintain stability and sometimes 
forgo their view as to what would be constitutionally best in the 
interest of achieving legal clarity.219  Knick’s decision to 
overrule the state-exhaustion ripeness doctrine will promote 
legal clarity in the litigation of takings claims by eliminating the 
“Catch-22” experienced by property owners in seeking just 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 
5. Justices are obligated to maintain stable 
understandings unless “sufficiently powerful legal or moral 
considerations call for a different course.”220  The multifactor 
test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether to 
overrule its precedent does not help discern “the central 
consideration, which involves the egregiousness of the alleged 
error — as measured in both moral and legal terms — as well as 
the costs of correcting it.”221  Justice Roberts aptly characterized 
the egregiousness of the error in Williamson County as “not just 
wrong.  Its reasoning was exceptionally ill-founded and 
conflicted with much of our takings jurisprudence.”222 
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6. Justices should accept historical precedent that is 
reasonably just and practical.  However, if adhering to 
precedent produces a result that is not reasonably just, the 
justices should reconsider the question of the precedent’s 
validity.223  Williamson County produced results that were not 
just by requiring adherence to a ripeness doctrine that 
precluded many takings plaintiffs from pursuing their takings 
claims in federal court as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.224 
7. “Justices should resolve doubts about proper 
interpretations and priorities of authority” with an eye to 
legitimacy concerns that may require them to make partly moral 
judgments.225  Justice Roberts noted that “the force of stare 
decisis is ‘reduced’ when rules that do not ‘serve as a guide to 
lawful behavior’ are at issue” and “holding that uncompensated 
takings violate the Fifth Amendment will not expose 
governments to new liability.”226  Just compensation requires 
some moral judgment about what is “just” and allowing a 
property owner to bring a takings claim under § 1983 will 
provide them the opportunity to receive just compensation 
under federal takings jurisprudence. 
Fallon proposes the “reflective equilibrium theory,” grounded in 
existing practice, to transcend the existing constitutional theories of 
originalism and living constitutionalism and sharpen our “thinking 
about how Supreme Court decision making could best promote legal 
and moral legitimacy while simultaneously exemplifying an ideal of 
constitutional argument in good faith.”227  The reflective equilibrium 
model, drawn from moral and political philosophy elaborated by John 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, provides insights for constitutional law 
in so far as it aims for principled consistency.228  Fallon proposes that 
we “recognize the need to balance adaptability with argumentative 
good faith” and allow justices to clarify, refine, or even change their 
interpretive methodology based “upon further reflection triggered by 
the facts or imperatives of an unanticipated case.”229  In other words, 
the Court’s legitimacy is strengthened by using good practical and 
moral judgment when questioning precedent and by supporting its 
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judgment with strong and good-faith arguments that demonstrate 
adaptability and reflection based on the facts of the case before them. 
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor joined the majority opinion in 
Williamson County.  While they were not present for its overruling in 
Knick, they called for its eventual reversal in their San Remo Hotel 
concurrence, also joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy.230  We 
doubt there are many Supreme Court decisions where two of the 
justices who decided the original precedent later admitted their 
decision might well have been mistaken.  These justices in the San 
Remo Hotel concurrence exemplify the reflective equilibrium model 
by showing a willingness to question precedent in good faith.  In the 
unanticipated case of San Remo Hotel, the plaintiffs were precluded 
from relitigating their takings claims in a Section 1983 action because 
the issues were already adjudicated by the state court.231  The facts and 
resulting imperative of res judicata in the San Remo Hotel case 
triggered further reflection by the justices to revisit the issue because 
of the real anomalies the state-litigation rule created.232  Justice 
Rehnquist noted that he joined the Williamson County opinion “[b]ut 
further reflection and experience lead me to think that the 
justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its 
impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.”233  What better illustration of 
using Fallon’s reflective equilibrium theory to transcend the existing 
constitutional theories of originalism and living constitutionalism? 
iii. The “Second-Best Stare Decisis” Theory 
In his book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, Professor 
Randy J. Kozel develops a “theory of precedent designed to enhance 
the stability and impersonality of constitutional law” by rethinking how 
stare decisis interacts with constitutional theory.234  In his “second-best 
stare decisis” theory, which is intended to appeal to both originalists 
and living constitutionalists,235 Kozel attempts to narrow the factors 
relevant to deciding whether to retain or overrule a precedent to 
include only those that could be applied by justices who have distinctly 
different theories of constitutional interpretation.236 
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Recognizing that his approach “has some features in common with 
the doctrine of stare decisis that currently operates at the Supreme 
Court,” Kozel identifies these factors to include “a decision’s 
procedural workability, the accuracy of its factual premises, and the 
reliance it has yielded.”237  Knick addresses all three of these factors.  
It found that the Williamson County state-litigation requirement is 
“unworkable in practice” because of the preclusive effect of a state 
court’s decision resolving a takings claim in a subsequent federal 
forum.238  The Court also determined that the factual accuracy or 
quality of the precedent’s reasoning was lacking, in that the reasoning 
in Williamson County “was exceptionally ill-founded and conflicted 
with much of our takings jurisprudence.”239  Finally, the Court found 
“no reliance interests on the state-litigation requirement,”240 a 
conclusion supported by the likely practical impact of overruling 
Williamson County.241 
The most significant departure from current practice that Kozel 
proposes relates to a precedent’s substantive effects, the relevance of 
which depends on a Justice’s theory of constitutional interpretation.  
Kozel asserts that the decision whether or not to follow precedent 
should not include the substantive effects unless the judge in question 
views the precedent as “extraordinarily harmful.”242  Ignoring the 
substantive effects of Williamson County is difficult given that the 
effect of the ripeness requirement is to preclude a plaintiff from 
litigating a takings claim in federal court.  It is the substantive effect of 
this rule that makes it mistaken.  Thus, at least in the Knick case, we 
would argue that substantive effects should not be excluded because 
they must be considered as part of the process of examining the 
accuracy of the precedent’s factual premises.  It might also be possible 
to interpret Robert’s language in Knick to conclude that he  indeed 
views the precedent as extraordinarily harmful.243  But, even if we 
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completely ignore substantive effects, the overruling of Williamson 
County was amply justified under Kozel’s criteria of workability, 
factual accuracy, and lack of strong reliance interests. 
Alternatively, Kozel proposes an approach focused on the structure 
of Supreme Court decision-making that would require a supermajority 
vote to overrule a precedent.244  Such a requirement would compel 
cooperation among the justices and “lower the chances that a 
precedent will be jettisoned due to nothing more than personnel shifts 
— and accompanying changes in the Court’s interpretive locus.”245  It 
is unclear whether the Knick Court could have obtained a 
supermajority vote through compromise, particularly because it 
followed so quickly after the overruling of another precedent in 
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.246 
iv. Reasoned Elaboration of the Criteria Used for Overruling 
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt observes that there continues to be 
confusion over the Court’s criteria for overruling prior cases.247  He 
discounts Professor Jerrold Israel’s findings from his classic 1963 study 
on overruling prior cases that the reasons given by the justices “fell into 
three categories: changed conditions, the lessons of experience 
(including unworkability), and conflicting precedents.”248  While 
Gerhardt accepts that the Court has “generally grounded its 
overrulings on one or more of these reasons,” he argues that these 
criteria may be manipulated too easily.249  Some justices may use 
changed conditions to overrule a decision, and others argue that it is 
the legislature that should take these conditions into account.250  In 
addition, conflicting precedents have not necessarily yielded 
overrulings, and the justices have disagreed over “what would qualify 
as a lesson of experience requiring an explicit overruling.”251 
Applying the criteria identified by Israel would give minimal 
guidance to the Court in deciding whether to overrule Williamson 
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County.  First, the conditions involved in asserting an inverse 
condemnation claim have  undergone only limited change since the 
Court recognized a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.252  Granted, there have been multiple Supreme Court cases 
guiding litigants and judges in determining whether “the regulation 
goes too far,” but the refinement of theory has not changed the basic 
idea that an individual property owner should not have to bear the 
burdens of regulation that should be borne by the public as a whole.253 
Williamson County created a ripeness rule that denied regulatory 
taking claimants the opportunity to bring their claims in federal 
court.254  Few other conditions have changed regarding the efficacy of 
regulatory takings claims, though post-Williamson County decisions 
have revealed additional flaws in the workability of the state-
exhaustion requirement, and exacerbated the “Catch-22” it creates.255  
Similarly, there are no conflicting precedents regarding the state 
exhaustion requirement from Williamson County, only widespread 
criticism of the decision by lawyers, judges (including the original 
justices who decided the case), and scholars.256  The main grounds that 
would support Knick’s overruling of precedent, under the Israel 
criteria, are the lessons of experience (including unworkability) after 
more than three decades of litigation frustration from the “Catch-22” 
created by Williamson County.257 
Gerhardt also disagrees with the approach suggested by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, which calls for less than the usual deference to 
precedents when the prior decisions were the result of a 5–4 vote with 
vigorous dissents.258  The Williamson County decision would not have 
qualified for a less than deferential approach to precedent under 
Justice Rehnquist’s theory as it was a 7–1 vote with Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s majority decision joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, 
and O’Connor and concurrences by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Marshall and Stevens.259  Justice Byron White dissented on the grounds 
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that the issues were not ripe for decision, and Justice Lewis Powell did 
not take part in the decision.260 
Instead, Gerhardt calls for a reasoned elaboration of the criteria the 
Court uses for overruling, including the reasoning of the individual 
justices as to why they rejected or adhered to the precedent.261  By 
openly and fully discussing their reasoning, the justices will help assure 
people the Court takes precedent seriously for the purpose of 
preserving “social or institutional values of stability and continuity in 
constitutional law.”262  In Knick, both the majority and the dissent fully 
discussed their reasoning in rejecting or upholding Williamson 
County.263  Even though Knick was a 5–4 decision, the overruling of 
precedent came after allowing three decades of litigation experience to 
test the workability of the state ripeness doctrine.264   
Two of the justices who originally joined in the Williamson County 
decision later recognized the wrongness of the state-exhaustion 
requirement, and there were many critics of the holding because it 
denied property owners the right to litigate their Fifth Amendment 
challenges in federal court.265  Justice Roberts clearly stated his 
reasoning as to why the precedent was erroneous and why it deserved 
to be overruled under the criteria established by the Court’s 
jurisprudence.266  The dissent similarly outlined its reasoning as to why 
the precedent was correct and should be sustained.267  Based on the 
Court’s full and open discussion of its reasoning, observers should take 
heart in the Court’s  thorough attempt to preserve the rule of law and 
recognize the importance of constraint and stability. 
CONCLUSION 
If, as the Supreme Court concluded in Knick, Williamson County 
was wrongly decided, the doctrine of stare decisis did not justify 
retaining it.  That is true under the Supreme Court’s current criteria for 
overruling precedent.  It is also true under leading originalist and living 
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constitutionalist theories of precedent, except perhaps those that 
require near-absolute deference to established doctrine. 
Other recent Supreme Court decisions may, perhaps, raise 
legitimate concerns about the extent to which the Court might embark 
on unjustified reversals of precedent.  However, such fears are 
misplaced when it comes to Knick’s reversal of Williamson County. 
It is still possible to argue that Williamson County should have been 
retained in order to forestall reversal of other, more defensible 
precedents.  Perhaps any reversal of precedent risks creating a 
dangerous slippery slope.  But, unless we are committed to the idea 
that all precedents should be left undisturbed, no matter how 
problematic they are, it makes little sense to argue for maintaining a 
precedent whose overruling is amply justified merely because the 
Court might later go on reverse better precedent.  If the justices are 
willing and able to apply criteria for overruling precedent impartially, 
then they should be able to tell the difference between a case that easily 
fits the relevant criteria — as Williamson County did — and one that 
does not.  Overruling Williamson County was an easy case because it 
was justified on a wide range of different criteria. 
If, on the other hand, invocations of stare decisis are merely 
smokescreens for the justices’ jurisprudential or political objectives, 
then it still makes little sense to keep dubious precedents in place 
merely to protect others whose retention is proper.  If the justices are 
willing to set aside stare decisis whenever it is convenient to do so,268 
then leaving Williamson County on the books would not prevent them 
from overruling other precedents in the future, especially if getting rid 
of them is an important priority of their judicial philosophy or their 
wing of the court. 
This Article does not attempt to resolve the issue of what is 
ultimately the best approach to stare decisis.  Nor do we attempt to 
determine whether the justices genuinely care about stare decisis, to 
the extent of being willing to leave in place precedents they believe are 
seriously misguided.269  We do, however, conclude that Knick’s 
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overturning of Williamson County was justified under a wide range of 
jurisprudential theories of precedent. 
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